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Unions and compensating wage 
differentials for workplace accident risk: 
the English and Welsh railway industry, 
1902–12† 
By PETER ANDERSON ∗  
 
The effect of unions on workers’ wage premiums for accepting on-the-job accident risk 
is a prominent subset of compensating differentials research. This article contributes  
to the literature by using a newly-constructed balanced panel of railwaymen working 
in the traffic departments of three prominent Edwardian railway companies with 
operations in England and Wales. It avoids previous issues of endogeneity by 
controlling for a number of variables correlated with the risk rates, notably individual 
fixed effects. The results show that the largest railway union of the time, the 
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, was able to transform growing union 
density into power that increased wage premiums for fatal accident risk, although 
railwaymen’s wages did not compensate them for non-fatal accident risk. This article 
also considers how this relationship differed by varying levels of company-specific 
human capital as measured by tenure. It finds a non-linear relationship for both risk 
rates across the tenure cohorts. 
 
 
he theory of compensating differentials asserts that wages will adjust to equalize 
differences between jobs.1 This insight from Adam Smith has primarily spawned 
papers that have found evidence of companies paying workers higher wages or 
‘bribes’ to accept the ‘bad’ that is on-the-job fatal accident risk because it is safe to 
assume that workers universally dislike the risk of being killed at work.2 Some 
researchers have tested whether unions or union membership affect the premium 
employees receive for working in unsafe conditions. Fairris hypothesized that 
unions may negatively affect compensating differentials if they implement 
automatic pay scales or eliminate perceived arbitrary differences in pay that 
actually reflect differences in risk. He called this ‘wage levelling’.3 Other benefits 
gained from collective bargaining, such as a reduction in the length of the work 
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† This article is a revised version of chapter 6 of my D.Phil. thesis and I would like to thank my supervisor, Jane 
Humphries, in addition to my examiners, Peter Scott and Knick Harley. I would also like to thank Price V. Fishback 
who first suggested I investigate compensating differentials in the Edwardian railway industry and later provided 
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1 Smith, Wealth of nations, pp. 201–2. 
2 Viscusi, ‘Value of risks’, pp. 1926–7. 
3 Fairris, ‘Compensating wage differentials’, pp. 358–60. 
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week or higher overtime earnings, may also compensate workers for higher risk. 
Alternatively, unions may provide workers with better information about the risk 
they face or counteract large employers’ ability to push down wages,  both  of 
which should lead to higher compensating differentials.4 The way unions influence 
compensating differentials for accident risk ultimately depends on the ends the 
unions pursue.5 
Empirical studies have not reached a consensus. In modern labour markets, 
Viscusi and Aldy’s survey reports that ‘Most studies of the U.S. labor market find 
that union affiliation is positively correlated with a greater wage-risk trade-off while 
the international evidence is much more mixed’.6 The same is true of historical 
research on this topic. Fishback and Kantor’s study of American workers during 
the Progressive Era report that union members received higher wage premiums for 
accident risk in one state but not in two others.7 Kim and Fishback’s historical study 
of American railroads, to which this article owes a debt, finds that compensating 
differentials for accident risk declined at a time of increasing union importance.8 
This uncertainty is compounded by the fact that the majority of papers studying 
the impact of unions on compensating differentials are affected by omitted-variable 
bias, which at the very least calls into  question  the  reported  magnitude  of  the 
risk rates’ coefficients. Viscusi and Aldy’s survey  reveals  that  only  one  of  the 
14 papers on this topic in non-US labour markets,  Kim  and  Fishback’s  1999 
paper on South Korea, controls for fatal  accident  risk,  non-fatal  accident  risk, 
and the effect of workers’ compensation laws on these accident differentials.9 All  
of these variables are highly correlated and not including them leads to issues        
of endogeneity. Kim and Fishback’s  paper, however, is  not  directly  comparable 
to the other studies because of its unique use of a panel of industries instead of 
individual workers.10 Related to this, the paucity of individual-level panel data in 
compensating differentials estimations11 means most studies have  not controlled  
for the time-invariant aspects of an individual that are correlated to the accident  
risk of the job he or she chooses. Workers skilled at avoiding on-the-job danger may 
sort into higher-paying, riskier jobs12 while higher-quality workers that deem safety 
a normal good will sort into higher-paying, safer jobs.13 Failure to control for the 
former will lead to an overestimate of the wage premium for accepting on-the-job 
risk, while failure to control for the latter can lead to a negative correlation between 
risk and remuneration. 
 
4 Viscusi and Aldy, ‘Value of a statistical life’, pp. 43–4. 
5 Crouch, Trade unions, p. 139. 
6  Viscusi and Aldy, ‘Value of a statistical life’, p. 43. 
7 Fishback and Kantor, ‘“Square deal”’, pp. 843–4. 
8 Kim and Fishback, ‘American railroading’, pp. 812–13. 
9 Viscusi and Aldy, ‘Value of a statistical life’, pp. 45–9. US labour market studies fare little better, with only 
three of 16 papers controlling for all of these variables. A closer look, however, shows that Dorman and Hagstrom, 
‘Wage compensation’, pp. 127–8n., never control for fatal and non-fatal risk in the same regression. Dorsey and 
Walzer, ‘Workers’ compensation’, pp. 645–6, use industry-level risk rates rather than occupational risk rates, which 
they try to remedy by excluding white-collar workers who have a much lower risk of injury in the same industry. 
The third, to which I did not have access, is a chapter authored by Dorsey in which he uses industry averages as 
his unit of observation. See Viscusi and Aldy, ‘Value of a statistical life’, p. 22. 
10 Kim and Fishback, ‘Impact’, pp. 236–7. 
11 Viscusi and Aldy, ‘Value of a statistical life’, p. 16. 
12 Kniesner, Viscusi, Woock, and Ziliak, ‘Evidence from panel data’, p. 74. 
13 Lavetti, ‘Estimation’, p. 165. 
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To my knowledge, this article is the first to apply individual-level panel data 
to the question of how unions impact on compensating differentials. It uses a 
newly-compiled balanced panel of 838 railwaymen spanning the years 1902–12 to 
determine whether the largest railway union in the UK, the Amalgamated Society 
of Railway Servants (ASRS), was able to translate growing railway union density 
and changes in wage-determining institutions into power that affected Edwardian 
railwaymen’s compensating differentials for accident risk.14 This article’s estimates 
avoid endogeneity by controlling for railwaymen’s time-invariant determinants 
of the jobs they chose, fatal accident risk, non-fatal accident risk, and change   
in the Workmen’s Compensation Act during this period, while analysis of the 
same industry prevents conflation of the risk premiums with industry-specific 
premiums.15 The results show that the ASRS was able to transform growing union 
density into power that increased the wage premiums that railway companies paid 
their men to accept on-the-job fatal accident risk, although their wages did not 
compensate them for greater non-fatal accident risk. Finally, the article considers 
how these accident-risk premiums varied by differing levels of company-specific 
human capital as measured by tenure, finding a non-linear relationship for both 
risk rates across the tenure cohorts. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section I looks at the wage-setting 
process in the UK railway industry and how railway unions played a role in changing 
this. Section II explains the dataset and the risk variables used. Section III describes 
the fixed effects model used to estimate railwaymen’s compensating differentials for 
fatal and non-fatal accident risk. Section IV assesses the regressions’ outcomes, and 
section V provides concluding remarks. 
 
I 
The Edwardian UK railway industry was a dangerous place to work by both 
contemporary and modern standards. The fatal accident risk rates for goods 
guards and shunters, the two most dangerous railway grades, because they both 
performed shunting duties,16 were more than two times higher than those of miners, 
quarrymen, or textile workers.17 In the six years preceding the First World War, the 
railway industry’s fatal compensation cases comprised an average of 11.3 per cent 
of the total fatal cases from the seven industries originally required to compensate 
employees and their dependents under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.18 From 
1900 to 1913, an average of 470.7 and 452.3 railwaymen died per year in workplace 
 
 
14 The term ‘power’ is used throughout this article in the way requoted by Levesque and Murray, ‘Understanding 
union power’, p. 335. It is ‘the “power to”, which is union “agents’ abilities to bring about significant effects, 
specifically by furthering their own interests and/or affecting the interests of others, whether positively or 
negatively” (Lukes, Power, p. 65)’. 
15 Dorman and Hagstrom, ‘Wage compensation’; Dillingham, ‘Influence’; Leigh, ‘Compensating wages’. 
16 For further details of each grade’s duties, see ‘Dictionary of occupational terms’, 
http://doot.spub.co.uk/listing.php (accessed on 17 March 2021). 
17 TNA, Railwaymen’s charter, ZLIB 29/630, p. 9. 
18 Statistics of Compensation (P.P. Annual Returns). The Great Eastern Railway (GER) contracted out their 
compensation and these returns do not include their fatalities. Only the 1908–13 returns include deaths caused by 
industrial diseases. The seven original industries—shipping, factories, docks, mines, quarries, construction, and 
railways—had an annual average of 3,615 fatal accidents compensated under this Act in these six years. 
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accidents in the UK and Great Britain, respectively,19 while the whole of Great 
Britain had 141 total workplace deaths in 2017/18.20 
If Edwardian railwaymen earned compensating differentials, it is because their 
companies’ internal wage-determining institutions reflected levels of workplace 
accident risk. Company-specific internal labour markets (ILMs) determined the 
grades at which men entered railway service, job ladders, promotion rates, and 
wages.21  They also exhibited some flexibility, as companies could adjust wages    
to reflect local variations in levels of risk for specific groups of employees. When 
railwaymen had a complaint, a deputation of men would communicate it to local 
company officials in a meeting or by a signed petition that enumerated the men’s 
desired changes. The local officials would then forward these complaints to senior 
officials with the power to rectify the grievances.22 Changes in wages could also be 
particular, as railway companies sometimes made changes in pay scales for specific 
grades at specific stations.23 
Prior to 1907, railway unions had little influence on the wage-setting process and 
only the North Eastern Railway (NER) formally recognized the oldest and largest 
railway union, the ASRS. Founded in 1871, the ASRS represented railwaymen 
‘connected with the manipulation of traffic’, but excluded grades they considered 
distinct trades, such as the coachbuilders employed in the works at Swindon and 
Crewe, in addition to salaried grades such as station masters and clerks.24 The three 
grades in this study’s panel—goods guards, passenger guards, and signalmen— 
could all join the ASRS. Table 1 shows the number of ASRS members for selected 
grades in 1904 and 1911 along with the percentage of that grade belonging to the 
ASRS and its membership as a percentage of total ASRS membership.25 
In addition to the ASRS, three other main railway unions sought to represent 
non-salaried railwaymen. The Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and 
Firemen (ASLEF) only catered to grades in locomotive departments: the drivers, 
firemen, and engine cleaners. As shown in table 1, some men in these grades 
also joined the ASRS, which had more engine drivers and firemen as members 
in 1904 than the total ASLEF membership. ASLEF membership surpassed the 
ASRS’s numbers in these two grades in 1911, but only by slightly more than 1,600 
men. The General Railway Workers’ Union (GRWU) represented railwaymen 
who could not join the ASRS. This included men working in railway shops, 
permanent-way men, and railwaymen employed in goods departments. The United 
Pointsmen’s and Signalmen’s Society (UPSS) only allowed signalmen to join its 
ranks,26 although more signalmen joined the ASRS. 
 
19 Railway Accidents (P.P. Annual Returns). This includes the servants of contractors killed while working on the 
railways. 
20 Health and Safety Executive, ‘RIDFATAL’, tab. 1. 
21 Howlett, ‘Evidence’, and idem, ‘Internal labour dynamics’, provide details of the GER’s traffic department’s 
ILM. Savage, ‘Discipline’, covers the GWR locomotive department’s ILM. Anderson, ‘“Tall and lithe”’, gives a 
broader overview of ILM workings. 
22 R.C. on the Railway Conciliation Scheme of 1907. Minutes of Evidence (P.P. 1912/13, XLV), Q.3,922, Q.7,408, 
23 TNA, Register of London and North Western Railway (LNWR) salaried and waged staff, RAIL 410/1804. 
This is a typed circular attached to fo. 321 and explains the change in the pay scale that applied to brakesmen 
working at Bescot. 
24 Clerks could join the Railway Clerks’ Association. 
25 Gupta, ‘Railway trade unionism’, p. 126n. The ASRS only provided membership by grade in 1875, 1898, 
and 1904. 
26 R.C. on the Railway Conciliation Scheme of 1907. Minutes of Evidence (P.P. 1912/13, XLV), Q.2,024. 
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Table 1. ASRS membership by selected grade 
 
  1904    1911  
Total Grade ASRS  Total Grade ASRS 
members (%) (%)  members (%) (%) 
Goods guards 8,454 55.9 15.8  9,738 63.5 12.9 
Passenger guards 2,137 28.1 4.0     
Signalmen 6,462 23.1 12.1  10,651 37.1 14.2 
Engine drivers 8,740 34.9 16.3  10,233 37.4 13.6 
Firemen 6,694 28.8 12.5  11,554 45.5 15.3 
Shunters 5,585 47.1 10.4  9,851 74.2 13.1 
Notes: ASRS: Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants. The 1904 union data by grade pertain to Sept. 1904. Gupta, ‘Railway 
trade unionism’, used 1904 accident returns to calculate the percentage of each grade that was unionized. He also provided 
the number of members in a grade as a percentage of ASRS membership. Based on these latter figures, the extrapolated ASRS 
membership ranges from 50,882 to 62,853 members. Friendly Societies (P.P. 1905, LXXV), p. 411, puts total ASRS membership 
at the end of 1904 at 53,407, which is the number used to calculate ‘ASRS (%)’ for 1904. J. H. Thomas testified before the 1911 
Royal Commission that his membership data by grade came from the previous week, which would make it the week beginning 
Monday 21 Aug. 1911. The no. of signalmen is based on membership numbers for that grade at the end of June 1911. The 
percentages come from employment figures in 1910, while total ASRS membership comes from what was reported for the ASRS 
at the end of 1910. Thomas cited no membership data for passenger guards. 
Sources: 1904 membership: Gupta, ‘Railway trade unionism’, pp. 151–2; Friendly Societies (P.P. 1905, LXXV), p. 411. 1911 
membership: R.C. on Conciliation (P.P. 1912–13, XLV), Q.2,024 (non-signalmen grades), Q.6,602 (signalmen). 1910 employment 
by grade: Railway Accidents (P.P. 1911, LXX), p. 41. 1910 ASRS membership: Friendly Societies (P.P. 1911, LXXVI), p. 740. 
 
Based on table 1’s figures, the ASRS had 2.65 times more signalmen as members 
than the UPSS in 1904, a number that grew to 2.8 times greater by 1911. In 
1913, the ASRS, GRWU, and UPSS amalgamated to form the National Union 
of Railwaymen (NUR). The ASLEF remained independent and is so to this day. 
Figure 1 shows these unions’ members as a percentage of non-salaried UK 
railwaymen for the years 1900–13. Employment totals come from the Board    
of Trade’s (hereafter the Board) annual reports on the wages and hours of  
labour which reported employment for the 27 largest railway company employers. 
Employment data from 1911 show that these companies employed about 95 per 
cent of UK railwaymen.27 The Board’s figures on total railwaymen were adjusted 
accordingly and then rounded to the nearest whole number to compute total 
non-salaried railway employment for a given year. The union density figures are 
calculated in this way for a few reasons. The first is that salaried railwaymen were 
ineligible to join any of these four unions. Second, this method demonstrates the 
changes and growth in total union density within the railway industry. Lastly, the 
ASRS had more influence among both railwaymen and companies because it had a 
higher percentage of total railwaymen as members rather than just claiming a high 
percentage of a few select grades.28 
The period 1907–12, when ASRS union density never fell below its highest 
level in the preceding years, saw the advent of institutional changes in the 
railway industry’s wage-setting process. In 1907, the ASRS and ASLEF sent 
their respective National Programmes to each railway company and requested a 
meeting to discuss the Programmes’ demands for improved wages and working 
conditions. All of the companies rebuffed the unions’ overtures except the NER. 
 
27 Railway Companies (Staff and Wages) (P.P. 1913, LVIII). 
28 Section III discusses of the low percentage of ASLEF, GRWU, and UPSS members elected to 1907 Scheme 
boards relative to ASRS members. 























Figure 1. Railway union membership as a percentage of UK non-salaried railwaymen, 
1900–13 
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com] 
Notes: The same no. of total UK non-salaried railwaymen deflates membership for each union. See section I for a more detailed 
explanation. ASRS: Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants; ASLEF: Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen; 
GRWU: General Railway Workers’ Union; UPSS: United Pointsmen’s and Signalmen’s Society; NUR: National Union of 
Railwaymen. The ASRS, GRWU, and UPSS amalgamated in 1913 to form the NUR. 
Sources: Union membership: Friendly Societies (P.P. 1903–14, Annual Returns); non-salaried UK railwaymen employment: Wages  
and Hours of Labour (P.P. 1903–14/16, Annual Returns). 
 
 
ASRS leadership put strike action before its members for a vote in October 1907 
and more than 78 per cent of the returned ballots opted to strike to force the 
companies to discuss the National Programme with union representatives.29 The 
task of preventing a strike fell upon Lloyd George, then president of the Board, who 
brokered a compromise between the companies and unions known as the Railway 
Conciliation and Arbitration Scheme of 1907 (hereafter the 1907 Scheme).30 
The 1907 Scheme introduced a hierarchical structure of conciliation boards for 
the negotiation of changes to ‘rates of wages and hours of labour’. Railwaymen 
would first be grouped into sections based on their grade. When a section of 
railwaymen and their company could not resolve matters through ‘the usual 
channels’ the railwaymen’s elected representatives met company officials at the 
Sectional Boards. Unresolved negotiations at this stage proceeded to the Central 
Boards. If the railwaymen and company representatives still could not reach an 
agreement, then the matter went before an independent arbitrator whose award 
was binding. Only at the arbitration stage could union officials not in the employ 
 
29 Howell, Respectable radicals, p. 12. 
30 Of the four major railway unions, only the UPSS representative did not sign the 1907 Scheme. See R.C. on  
the Railway Conciliation Scheme of 1907. Minutes of Evidence (P.P. 1912/13, XLV), QQ.5,545–9. The NER formed 
a separate agreement. See ibid., QQ.6,143–4. 
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of that company represent the men.31 Regarding the changes made by the 1907 
Scheme to railway company ILMs, the Webbs wrote that ‘for the first time the 
autocracy of the railway management was broken’;32  while the general manager   
of the Midland Railway called the companies’ assent to arbitration ‘revolutionary’ 
because it took away the companies’ ‘power of deciding’ railwaymen’s ‘rates of pay 
and … hours’.33 
The 1907 Scheme was to last seven years and despite initial optimism from all 
sides34 the August 1911 British railway strike made it evident that the scheme 
had failed to pacify railwaymen. Described as ‘One of the outstanding strikes of 
the period’,35 the official portion of the railway strike ended on 19 August after 
Lloyd George, now chancellor of the Exchequer, again negotiated a compromise 
between the two sides. As part of the agreement, a Royal Commission investigated 
the workings of the 1907 Scheme and gave its report in October. Railway company 
and union representatives met for three days in December 1911 before they 
reached an agreement on the Royal Commission’s suggested revisions to the 1907 
Scheme.36 The resulting 1911 Agreement retained the hierarchical structure of the 
conciliation boards while making some changes, such as eliminating the Central 
Boards. It also allowed individuals not working for a company to represent the 
men, which meant railway union officials could argue the men’s case at any point 
in the negotiations.37 The 1911 Agreement enhanced railway union officials’ power 
to affect compensating differentials for accident risk if they chose. 
Prior   to   this,  ASRS   leadership   frequently   demanded   improvements to 
railwaymen’s safety, hours, and compensation for workplace risks. In 1899, Richard 
Bell, general secretary of the ASRS, wrote to Lord Salisbury and the Board that 
‘The continually increasing number of accidents’ to railwaymen was ‘the subject of 
much anxiety’ to the ASRS.38 Bell again invoked concerns about workplace safety 
in defence of the ASRS’s 1907 All-Grades Programme which sought higher wages 
for all railwaymen and an eight-hour workday in addition to a minimum of nine 
hours rest between shifts. Bell defended these demands, writing that fatality rates 
calculated at the grade level showed some grades of railwaymen, such as goods 
guards, had an annual fatality rate greater than other dangerous occupations like 
miners or quarrymen.39 Bell also argued that long working hours led to workplace 
fatalities and railway accidents,40 an argument he reiterated when representing 
railwaymen at arbitration hearings under the 1907 Scheme.41 Both Bell and his 
successor, J. E. Williams, criticized the companies for increasing the intensity of 
 
 
31 Clegg, Fox, and Thompson, History of British trade unions, vol. I, p. 426. 
32 Webb and Webb, History of trade unionism, p. 527. 
33 R.C. on the Railway Conciliation Scheme of 1907. Minutes of Evidence (P.P. 1912/13, XLV), Q.12,912. 
34 R.C. Report (P.P. 1911, XXIX), p. 669; ‘Peace convention’, Economist, 9 Nov. 1907, p. 1904. 
35 Clegg, History of British trade unions, vol. 2, p. 26. 
36 Strikes and Lock-outs (P.P. 1912–13, XLVII), p. 69. 
37 Howell, Respectable radicals, pp. 224–5. The 1911 Agreement remained in place during the First World War, 
but its company-specific Boards for negotiation became ‘peripheral’, with some improvements for railwaymen 
negotiated at the national level during these years. 
38 R.C. on Accidents (P.P. 1900, XXVII), Q.2,605. 
39 TNA, Railwaymen’s charter, ZLIB 29/630, p. 9. 
40 Ibid., p. 5. 
41 TNA, GER arbitration, RAIL 1025/11, pp. 829–30; TNA, LNWR arbitration, RAIL 1025/17, pp. 288–9; 
North British Railway arbitration, RAIL 1025/18, p. 130. 
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Edwardian railwaymen’s work and thereby exposing the men to greater danger 
without having improved wage growth or reduced the hours worked.42 
 
II 
This article uses a panel of 838 railwaymen employed by three of the largest 
railway companies operating in England and Wales: the Great Central Railway 
(GCR), Great Western Railway (GWR), and London and South Western Railway 
(LSWR). All three companies ranked among the 10 largest railway employers, 
which also made them some of the largest UK employers.43  These  companies  
were selected because their staff books show a man’s employment history. At a 
minimum, this included an individual’s name, date  of  birth, date  of  entry  into  
the company, and changes to his grade, weekly wage, or the station where he 
worked. This record keeping differed  from  that  of  other  companies44  such  as 
the London and North Western Railway (LWNR), whose staff books tracked 
changes in specific grades at each station, rather than changes for individual 
railwaymen. 
I first collected the histories of 574 of these railwaymen at the National Archives 
at Kew.45 These men’s histories covered the years 1896–1913 because my original 
research used the Board’s triennial employment figures to calculate risk rates. This 
article uses annual employment data to calculate risk rates, which are available for 
fewer years.46 Working with a shorter period meant that the original panel was 
biased towards older, longer-tenured railwaymen. To rectify this, these companies’ 
staff books were revisited to add a sample of railwaymen whose inclusion was not 
strictly determined by having worked in one of these three grades since 1896. 
This new sample was collected in the same way as the previous sample, first 
generating a random number between one and 10 for each company. If the number 
for a company was five, for instance, every fifth page in that company’s ledgers 
was examined, and the histories of railwaymen that served as a goods guard, 
passenger guard, or signalman from 1902 to 1912 were recorded, which produced 
the histories of 264 more men.47 
All of the men in the dataset worked in their company’s traffic department. Some 
men worked in two of these three grades, but none held all three positions during 
 
42  TNA, Railwaymen’s charter, ZLIB 29/630, p. 17; ‘Railway servants’ congress’, The Times, 8 Oct. 1907, p. 7; 
Railway Agreements (P.P. 1911, XXIX), QQ.11,017–20. 
43 Wardley, ‘Emergence’, p. 102. Including salaried railwaymen, the GWR employed just over 70,000 men, the 
GCR 25,469, and the LSWR 24,898. 
44 The GER also recorded their employees’ work histories. Peter Howlett gave me access to his panel of GER  
railwaymen. I did not use it in this study because it consists of relatively old and long-tenured men by the end of 
1912. The GER staff books are not available online, which prevented me from adding a younger cohort of GER 
railwaymen that would have made Howlett’s panel more representative. See Howlett, ‘Internal labour dynamics’, 
pp. 402–4. 
45 The full dataset contains 182 men from the GCR, 605 from the GWR, and 51 from the LSWR. It does  
not include women because most jobs in the Edwardian railway industry were held by men. Furthermore, the 
ASRS did not admit women members and its successor, the NUR, only began accepting women during the First 
World War. I collected the staff books from TNA, but they are no longer available. They can now be found online 
at https://www.ancestry.co.uk/search/collections/1728/. GCR: Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire/Piece 235, 
237, 241, 243; GWR: Great Western/Uniformed Staff/No. 1 A–W–Z; LSWR: London and South Western/1865– 
1925 Wages Staff. 
46 The employment numbers used to calculate the risk rates are discussed later in this section. 
47 This is not to imply that I only added men who began work in these grades in 1902. 







their career. These three grades comprised  24.5  per  cent  of  total  employment 
and 28.8 per cent  of  all  wages  paid  in  English  and  Welsh  traffic  departments 
in 1913.48 They were also vital to a company’s  operations. During  the  August 
1911 strike, a memo to the government  stated  that  it  was  imperative  to  know 
the percentage of drivers, goods and mineral guards,  and  signalmen  that  had  
gone on strike’.49 In terms of their career paths, the Board reported a ‘normal 
system of promotion’ by which companies advanced shunters  to  goods guards,  
and porters advanced to either  signalmen  or  passenger  guards.  The  panel  is  
then not representative of locomotive departments which had separate pay scales 
and promotional ladders.50 It is also not representative of the entry-level grades, 
shunters and porters, who had lower company-specific human  capital  than  the 
men in the dataset and were more likely to quit working for a company because     
of it. Consequently, market-wide competitive pressures would have played a larger 
role in determining any compensating differentials received by these entry-level 
grades. 
The panel is also heavily weighted towards GCR and GWR railwaymen and 
does not contain LSWR passenger guards because their staff books did not specify 
whether a guard was a passenger guard, although they listed some men as goods 
guards. Nevertheless, the panel is representative of a wider group of guards and 
signalmen. Age and wages are the two variables available to compare the dataset 
against known characteristics of railwaymen in these grades. The ages of the men in 
the dataset fall within the age range of the majority of men working in these grades 
in 1911. In this year, guards in the dataset had a median age of 46 years, with a 
range of 33 to 65. The 1911 census for England and Wales  reports that guards   
aged   25 years made up more than 95 per cent of adult guards and those   35    
years accounted for 69.7 per cent. The dataset’s signalmen have  a median age of  
45 years, with a range of 32 to 65. Signalmen aged  25 years accounted for 92.6  
per cent of all adult signalmen in 1911, while those aged    35 years accounted for 
65.4 per cent.51 
For wages, the panel consists of men working for large companies operating 
in England and Wales, making it unrepresentative of their lower-paid Scottish 
and Irish counterparts.52 Company-specific wage data are only available for the 
final two years of this study. Table 2 compares the average weekly wages of the 
dataset’s grades with the weighted average weekly wage of the three companies 
used in this study and of the English and Welsh companies that adopted the 1907 
Scheme or the 1911 Agreement.53 The year 1912 is used to see how closely the 
 
48 Railway Companies (Staff and Wages) (P.P. 1914, LXXVII), p. 653. The figures are 25% and 30.2% for this 
study’s three companies. 
49 TNA, Liverpool railway strike, HO 45/10655/212470. It is likely that the memo’s author did not list passenger 
guards because his concern was the operation of goods train services. 
50 Earnings and Hours (P.P. 1912–13, CVIII), p. 11. The Board reported a locomotive department job ladder in 
which companies promoted engine cleaners to firemen and firemen to drivers. 
51 Census of England and Wales, 1911 (P.P. 1913, LXXVIII), p. 1320. I have taken adults to mean those 20 
years of age. The census does not differentiate between goods and passenger guards. Starting at age 25, the census 
reports employment figures by age every 10 years. No average age is provided. 
52 Earnings and Hours (P.P. 1912–13, CVIII), p. 3. This survey is not used for comparison because it did not 
report company-specific wages. 
53 Railway Conciliation Scheme Statement of Settlements (P.P. 1910, LXXX); Railway Conciliation Scheme Statement 
of Settlements (P.P. 1913, LVIII). The NER is included because they were one of the railway industry’s largest 
employers. 
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Table 2. Comparison of railwaymen’s average weekly wages (in shillings), 1912 
 
 Guards (%) Signalmen (%) 
Dataset 32.67 100 29.94 100 
GCR, GWR, LSWR 33.13 8 29.74 6.8 
England and Wales 32.58 2 28.26 1.6 
Notes: GCR: Great Central Railway; GWR: Great Western Railway; LSWR: London and South Western Railway. All weekly wages 
are nominal values in shillings. The wages for England and Wales are a weighted average of the companies that adopted the 1907 
Scheme or 1911 Agreement, including the North Eastern Railway. They pertain to the week ending 7 Dec. 1911. The returns        
did not report guards separately and included gatemen with signalmen. The average for the three companies is also a weighted 
average. The columns labelled (%) denote the number of men in that grade from the dataset as a percentage of that row’s cohort. 
Sources: Data: railwaymen dataset (see online app. S1). 1912 wages: Railway Companies (Staff and Wages) (P.P. 1913, LVIII). 
Companies used for weights: Statement of Settlements (P.P. 1910, LXXX); Statement of Settlements (P.P. 1913, LVIII). 
 
 
dataset’s wages approximate those of the wider industry once the 1911 Agreement 
had taken effect. The comparisons show differences of no more than a shilling 
for both groups of railwaymen, except between the dataset and the English and 
Welsh average for signalmen. This discrepancy is probably entirely due to the 
railway returns including lower-paid gatemen with signalmen while the dataset 
does not. 
The availability of employment data determined the choice of grades and years 
studied. The lagged objective fatal and non-fatal risk rates are reported as accidents 
per 100 workers employed per year. They come from the Board’s annual reports 
on railwaymen’s injuries, which listed the UK’s total fatal and non-fatal injuries by 
grade. These returns only updated the total number employed per grade every third 
year. For the intervening two years this study uses the employment data provided in 
the returns on the hours worked by particular groups of railwaymen. These reports 
include the individual employment figures for each grade in this dataset, but not for 
other grades, apart from examiners who made up a small portion of any company’s 
total employees. The average employment is taken for 1908 and 1909 when the 
hours’ returns reported more than one month. The December 1902 return is the 
first used to calculate these three grades’ employment.54 
Goods guards faced the highest average annual fatal accident risk per 100 
employed (0.22) from 1902 to 1912, followed by passenger guards (0.075), with 
signalmen (0.026) the relatively safest job of the three.55 The top panel in figure 2 
is a binned scatterplot of the natural log of the real weekly wage and the death rate 
lagged by one year. It shows the relationship between wages and fatal accident risk 
without accounting for the impact of union density, Workmen’s Compensation, a 
man’s company, his grade, or his permanent attitude towards risk. The scatterplot 
 
54 Railway Servants (Hours of Labour) (P.P. 1902–12/13). Overlapping employment figures occurred in 1901, 
1907, and 1910. The ratio of the average employment from the hours data to the average employment from the 
accident data in these years is 1 to 0.99 for goods guards. For passenger guards and signalmen it is 1 to 1.07       
and 1 to 1.03, respectively. These discrepancies might be due to employment data taken from different months. 
Nonetheless, the hours’ employment figures are still the best available in the years the Board did not update 
employment numbers. 
55 Railway Accidents (P.P. 1902–3, 1909–12/13); General Report (P.P. 1904–8). For the preceding decade, the 
Board only reported employment figures by grade in 1895 and 1898. Average fatalities per 100 employed in these 
two years were higher for goods guards (0.29) and signalmen (0.03), but lower for passenger guards (0.045). The 
latter two grades had below-average fatalities in these two years relative to 1891–1900, suggesting the Edwardian 
railway industry had become safer. 





Figure 2. Natural log of weekly real wages and fatal and non-fatal accident rates 
Notes: Each panel is a binned scatter plot of the natural log of real weekly wages (in shillings) on the respective accident risk rate. 
A regression line is included in each panel. 
Source: See section II for an explanation of how the lagged death and serious injury rates were calculated for this study. 
 
 
may only demonstrate the fact that goods guards earned a higher average weekly 
wage than passenger guards who earned more than signalmen.56 Columns 5 and 6 
in table 4 answer this question. 
The bottom panel in figure 2 shows this relationship for the serious non-fatal 
accident rate lagged by one year. The Board first set a standard definition for non- 
fatal injuries in 1896 when they required railway companies to report all non-fatal 
injuries that prevented the ‘servant injured, on any one of the three working days 
next after the occurrence of the accident, from being employed for five hours on 
his ordinary work’.57 This led to 50.1 per cent more non-fatal accidents being 
 
56 Earnings and Hours (P.P. 1912–13, CVIII), p. 17. 
57 General Report (P.P. 1897, LXXVII), p. 24. 











Union density × serious injury rate 
Workmen’s Compensation 1906 (1 = 1908–12) 0.45 (0.49) 0 1 
Workmen’s Compensation 1906 × death rate 0.04 (0.07) 0 0.24 
Workmen’s Compensation 1906 × serious injury rate 0.07 (0.12) 0 0.38 
Age (years) 42.24 (7.31) 23 66 
Age squared 1,837.79 (635.49) 529 4,356 
Tenure (years) 22.38 (6.96) 2 47 
Tenure squared 549.55 (333.36) 4 2,209 
Observations 9,218   
Notes: Feinstein’s (National income) CPI deflates railwaymen’s real weekly wages. The values for the weekly real wage (shillings) 
are obtained by converting the natural log figures from the preceding row into shillings. The standard deviation in the second row 
is calculated as 3.78 e3.39+0.12 e3.39. 




reported in 1896 than the previous year.58 The Board redefined what constituted a 
non-fatal injury at the end of 1906, now requiring railway companies to report    
any non-fatal accidents that caused ‘the person injured to be absent from his 
ordinary work for a whole day at any time’.59 In the following year, reported non- 
fatal accidents increased by 33 per cent. This article’s serious non-fatal accident 
rate, sirate, partially mitigates this definitional change by only including injuries  
in which a railwayman’s body part was broken or severed. From 1906 to 1907,    
the total number of such injuries increased by 13.7 per cent. Table 3 lists the 




This article estimates six regressions by adding different covariates, each regression 
saying something different about the relationship between wages and  accident 
rates. The full regression to be estimated is a log-linear fixed effects model. The 
individual-level fixed effects make it possible to control for each railwayman’s 
time-constant characteristics that are in turn correlated with the regressions’ risk 
variables.60 These include a railwayman’s innate cognitive and physical ability and 
his time-constant preference for risk. The model estimated is based on Thaler and 
Rosen’s hedonic-wage model, which showed that in equilibrium the compensating 
 
58 Ibid., p. 41. 
59 General Report (P.P. 1908, XCIV), p. 5. 
60 The use of individual-level data is one important way in which this study differs from Kim and Fishback’s 
study of American railroads which used job categories as the unit of observation; Kim and Fishback, ‘American 
railroading’, p. 806. 
Variables Mean (std. dev.) Min. Max. 
Natural log of weekly real wage (shillings) 3.39 (0.12) 2.95 3.74 
Weekly real wage (shillings) 29.67 (3.78) 19.10 42.09 
Death rate (per 100 employed, lagged 1 year) 0.10 (0.09) 0.01 0.27 
Serious injury rate (per 100 employed, lagged 1 year) 0.16 (0.12) 0.04 0.38 
Total employed (by grade, lagged 1 year) 20,913 (7,711) 6,748 28,658 
Union density (%) 16.02 (4.77) 11.07 25.96 











differential is equal to the partial derivative of the worker’s compensation in regard 
to accident risk.61 The full model is: 
lnrwageig jt = drategt−1β1 + sirategt−1β2 + udenset × drategt−1β3 + udenset 
× sirategt−1β4 + W C06 × drategt−1β5 + W C06 × sirategt−1β6 
+ agesqig jt β7 + tenuresqig jt β8 + GRADEβ9 + CITYβ10 
+ YEARβ11 + ai + εig jt (1) 
The dependent variable is the natural log of real weekly wages in shillings62 
for railwayman i, in grade g, stationed in a city or town with population j,        
in year t (t 1,…, T). The average  of  the  weekly  wage  is  used  for  those 
years in which a railwayman’s nominal weekly wage changed. The dependent 
variable underestimates each railwayman’s weekly remuneration because it is 
nearly impossible to value the non-wage benefits received by railwaymen, such as 
uniforms, company-provided housing, or the prospect of promotion. 
The variables drate and sirate are the respective fatal and serious non-fatal 
accident rates for a given grade per 100 employed. They are lagged by one year 
which makes 1902 the first year in  the  estimation.  The  lags  account  for  the  
time it would take railwaymen to update their perceptions of the risk they faced, 
petition their superiors for a change in wages, followed by railway management    
or negotiations under the conciliation schemes changing the company’s ILM to 
compensate railwaymen  adequately.  Limits  to  workers’ mobility  also  ‘reinforce 
a lagged influence’63 and the dataset’s railwaymen worked in grades where they 
developed grade- and company-specific skills that limited their movement to 
another grade, railway company, or industry.64 Under these circumstances, an 
increase in workplace danger would not immediately lead to a sizeable number      
of employees quitting. The corollary is that companies had no incentive to lose  
men with company-specific skills65 by not compensating them for the accident risk 
they faced. 
It is unlikely that these objective risk rates overestimate railwaymen’s subjective 
assessment of their workplace risk. One contemporary argued that ‘workmen as a 
class … do not practically discount the wages offered in different employments by 
making proper allowance for the inevitable trade risk of sickness or accident’.66 This 
conclusion is unfair. The ASRS acknowledged that goods guards earned more than 
passenger guards because the former performed shunting duties which increased 
their risk of injury.67 Family members in the railway industry, fellow employees, 
and personal experience would also have served as sources of information about 
 
61 Thaler and Rosen, ‘Value of saving a life’. 
62 Feinstein, National income, p. T132. Feinstein’s consumer price index (CPI) is used throughout to deflate 
nominal values. 
63 Kniesner et al., ‘Evidence from panel data’, p. 81. 
64 Railway Agreements (P.P. 1911, XXIX), Q.15,979. Frank Ree, general manager of the LNWR, told a 
departmental committee, ‘All that [a signalman] has done with the railway would be thrown away  [should he 
leave employment there] … Nobody wants a signalman except a railway’. 
65 Ibid., Q.15,986; Williamson et al., ‘Understanding’, pp. 258–9. 
66 Flux, ‘Compensation’, p. 298. 
67 ASRS, Census of wages, p. 42. 
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the dangers of railway work.68 The ASRS’s periodical Railway Review reported the 
Board’s accident numbers and printed articles on the deaths of railwaymen with 
titles such as ‘Shocking death of a guard’, which described the dead guard’s body 
as ‘frightfully mutilated’, while ‘A signalman cut to pieces’ tells of a signalman 
whose ‘brains were dashed out’.69 Modern studies have found that people tend to 
overestimate the potential of incurring risks that receive a large amount of media 
coverage such as aeroplane crashes or getting struck by lightning.70 If the same 
held for Edwardian workers, then lurid headlines like these were fully capable of 
preventing railwaymen from underestimating the danger of their jobs.71 
The union density variable, udense, is ASRS membership as a percentage of 
non-salaried railwaymen. UPSS membership is not included in the calculation of 
signalmen’s union density because this union played a marginal role in industrial 
relations during these years. From 1900 to 1912, the UPSS averaged a mere 2.8 per 
cent of union membership across the four main railway unions while the ASRS had 
an annual average of 74.1 per cent. UPSS representatives did not sign the 1907 
Scheme and they had few members on the 1907 Scheme boards, making up 1.9 per 
cent of railwaymen elected in the UK and 0.3 per cent in England and Wales. In 
contrast, ASRS members made up nearly 81 per cent of railwaymen on UK boards 
and 83.6 per cent for England and Wales.72 The ASRS, then, was the pre-eminent 
railway union. The actions of their men and officials determined whether growing 
union density led to changes that affected railwaymen’s compensating differentials. 
 The union density variable avoids the pitfall of not accounting for the various 
within-year changes that took place in this period, which would be a problem if the 
accident rates were interacted with a specific year or group of years. This interaction 
differs from papers that interacted workers’ union status with risk rates because both 
conciliation schemes covered all of the workers in the dataset. The sign on the 
interaction variables and the size of the coefficients depends on the importance that 
railwaymen and their union representatives placed on compensating differentials. 
Table 4 only reports the interactions because union density is the same for every 
railwayman in a given year, which makes it perfectly collinear with the  year 
dummies. The year 1912 is the final one in this study because the formation of the 
NUR in 1913 brought about an institutional arrangement markedly different from 
the oft-divided relations of the railway unions in the preceding years, while 
the government took over railway management in 1914. 
The Workmen’s Compensation Act interactions do not have the same specificity 
as the union density variable. In 1899, railway companies began making payments 
to injured workers and the dependents of deceased workers under the Workmen’s 
 
68  For some gruesome personal stories by former railwaymen, see Kenney, Men and rails, pp. 88–9; Reynolds, 
Engine-driving life, p. 26. 
69 ‘Shocking death of a guard’, Railway Review, 15 Jan. 1897, p. 1; ‘A signalman cut to pieces’, Railway Review, 
4 June 1897, p. 1. 
70 Viscusi, Smoking, p. 25. 
71 This should also counter any argument that this article’s UK objective risk rates overstate risk due to Scottish 
railway companies having higher fatal and non-fatal accidents per train mile run than the other UK companies. 
72 R.C. on the Railway Conciliation Scheme of 1907. Minutes of Evidence (P.P. 1912/13, XLV), Q.1,979; p. 728. 
In this first election, 15 of the 17 UPSS members elected in the UK were elected to boards on Scottish railway 
companies, with none in Ireland. The ASLEF and GRWU members also comprised a minor percentage of seats. 
ASLEF members accounted for 5% of UK seats and 6.9% of seats in England and Wales despite 1907 ASLEF 
membership comprising 27.7% of UK drivers, firemen, and cleaners. GRWU members filled 1.4% of UK seats 

































Notes: VSL: value of a statistical life. VSSI: value of a statistical serious injury. See section IV for an explanation of the calculation of VSL and VSSI. 
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses, clustering done at the individual railwayman level. The dependent variable is the natural log of weekly wages 
in shillings deflated by Feinstein’s (National income) CPI. Cols. 1–5 are estimated using OLS, col. 6 is a fixed effects regression and R2-within is reported for this column. Variables included 
in all regressions but not reported are: quadratics for age and tenure, a vector of dummies controlling for the population where the railwayman worked, and a full vector of year dummies.     
Cols. 1–5 include age and tenure variables. The Great Central Railway is the reference company in cols. 4–5. Signalmen are the reference grade in cols. 5–6. Col. 6 does not have company 
dummy variables because the individual fixed effects control for each man’s company since none of the men changed employers. 
























Coefficient (clustered std. error) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Death rate 0.427∗ ∗ ∗  (0.030) 0.369∗ ∗ ∗  (0.037) –0.131 (0.096) –0.105 (0.095) –0.147∗  (0.078) –0.162∗ ∗  (0.074) 
Serious injury rate 0.168∗ ∗ ∗  (0.024) 0.226∗ ∗ ∗  (0.028) 0.736∗ ∗ ∗  (0.069) 0.687∗ ∗ ∗  (0.069) 0.290∗ ∗ ∗  (0.044) 0.287∗ ∗ ∗  (0.042) 
Union density × death rate 3.109∗ ∗ ∗  (0.071)  0.044∗ ∗ ∗  (0.007) 
–0.043∗ ∗ ∗  (0.004) 
0.043∗ ∗ ∗  (0.00006) 
–0.042∗ ∗ ∗  (0.004) 
0.022∗ ∗ ∗  (0.006) 
–0.026∗ ∗ ∗  (0.004) 
0.023∗ ∗ ∗  (0.005) 
–0.026∗ ∗ ∗  (0.003) 
Union density × serious 
Workmen’s Compensation 
1906 × death rate 
  
0.206∗ ∗ ∗  (0.051) 
∗ ∗ ∗  
 
–0.093 (0.066) 
∗ ∗ ∗  
 
–0.121∗  (0.065) 









1906 × serious injury rate 
∗ ∗ ∗  ∗ ∗ ∗  ∗ ∗ ∗  ∗ ∗ ∗  ∗ ∗ ∗  3.552∗ ∗ ∗  (0.040) 
VSL in 1903 £3,294 £2,847 £2,747 £2,862 £745 £714 
VSL in 1912 £3,294 £4,436 £7,083 £6,868 £3,364 £3,310 
VSSI in 1903 £1,296 £1,743 £2,006 £1,713 £17 –£6 
VSSI in 1912 £1,296 £447 –£1,938 –£1,993 –£3,078 –£2,995 
Company dummies No No No Yes Yes No 
Grade dummies No No No No Yes Yes 
Individual fixed effects No No No No No Yes 
Observations 9,218 9,218 9,218 9,218 9,218 9,218 
R2 0.4592 0.4598 0.4635 0.4923 0.4978 0.3581 
 




Compensation Act 1897. Expected insurance pay-outs like those guaranteed by 
this Act negatively affect wage premiums for accident risk73 because they are an 
alternative insurance to that embedded in a worker’s wage.74 Previous measures 
of the impact of workmen’s compensation legislation have calculated the expected 
pay-outs, which in turn depends on suitable instrumental variables, or looked at 
how institutional changes affected the expected pay-out.75 The first method is 
not feasible here because payment for fatal accidents was contingent on whether 
the deceased had a dependent, something these companies’ staff histories did 
not record. Payments for non-fatal injuries depended on the length of time      
the man could not work, which is also unknown. For the second method, the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act 1906 modified the initial Act, not in the amount 
that beneficiaries received,76 but by increasing the probability that an injured 
railwayman or his dependents would receive compensation. Railwaymen could 
now claim compensation for serious or fatal injuries even if their own ‘serious and 
wilful misconduct’ caused the accident or if they were injured off their company’s 
premises while on duty.77 
The Workmen’s Compensation 1906 variable exploits this institutional change in 
a way  similar to that found in Kim and Fishback.78  It has a value of 1 for the   
years 1908–12, 1908 being the first full year in which the 1906 Act’s changes were 
in effect, and 0 for the preceding six years. As for union density, this article can 
only report the interaction between Workmen’s Compensation 1906 and the two risk- 
rate variables. If these interactions accurately measure the increased probability of 
claiming compensation in the latter period, their coefficients should both have a 
negative sign. If they capture other changes in these years or if the new accidents 
covered under the regulations were rare, then the interactions may have a positive 
sign or a small coefficient. 
The fixed effects model only includes the quadratic of age and tenure to account 
for diminishing returns to increases in these variables because the individual fixed 
effect controls for a man’s age and tenure when he entered into the dataset while 
the year dummies account for their annual increase. The OLS estimations include 
the lower order terms. The GRADE vector controls for the railwayman’s grade. 
In the absence of this control, the accident risk variables might partially control 
for the physical nature of a grade’s duties or the differences in pay between 
these grades. CITY is a vector of dummies controlling for the population where 
the railwayman worked.79 YEAR is a full complement of year dummies that 
control for macroeconomic shocks, such as the unemployment rate, that would 
affect railwaymen’s wages. They also control for institutional changes like the 
increase in a railwayman’s wages dictated by a company’s ILM or changes made 
 
73 Viscusi, ‘Value of risks’, pp. 1929–30; Viscusi and Moore, ‘Workers’ compensation’. 
74 Kniesner and Leeth, ‘Compensating wage differentials’, p. 77. 
75 For the former, see Moore and Viscusi, Compensation mechanisms, pp. 42, 174n. For the latter, see Fishback 
and Kantor, ‘Workers’, pp. 738–40. 
76 Wilson and Levy, Workmen’s compensation, vol. I, pp. 109–12. Payments to men under the age of 21 increased, 
though no one in this dataset was that young. 
77 Modern Records Centre, Univ. of Warwick, reports and proceedings, MSS.127/AS/1/1/37, p. 12. 
78 Kim and Fishback, ‘Impact’, p. 241. 
79 London 1 for those stationed in London; London_1 is for men stationed in a city with a population between 
London and 300,000; London_2 is for a population of 100,000–299,999; London_3 is for a population of 50,000– 
99,999; London_4 is for a population 18,000–50,000. 
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under the conciliation schemes, making the interaction between union density and 
accident rates a more precise answer  to this article’s central question. However, it  
is possible that ASRS union density and power were not necessarily distinct from 
one another.80 
The reference category is a signalman working in a region with a population of 
fewer than 18,000 people in 1902. The time-constant individual fixed effect ai also 
controls for each railwayman’s company in the fixed effects model because none 
of these men changed companies. This means it also controls for each company’s 
time-constant attitude towards workplace safety, should such an attitude exist. The 




Table 4 presents the results from six different regressions with clustered standard 
errors in parentheses. Clustering is done at the individual railwayman level. 
Columns 1 to 5 are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS), while column 6 
uses the fixed effects model. The un-interacted accident rates’ coefficients are large 
because the risk rates are calculated per 100 employees. For instance, the coefficient 
on death rate in column 1 implies a 42.7 per cent increase in weekly real wages in 
response to a one-unit increase in the lagged fatal accident risk rate. It is worth 
bearing in mind that the dataset’s average lagged fatal accident rate is one-tenth 
the size of such an increase. 
It is also important correctly to interpret the coefficients for death rate and 
serious injury rate after the inclusion of their interaction with union density. The 
fixed effects estimation in column 6 has all interactions and the most controls. Its 
death rate coefficient implies that real weekly wages would fall 16.2 per cent after 
the death rate increased by 1 per 100 employed. However, the death rate coefficient 
only measures the effect of increased fatal accident risk at a union density of 0 per 
cent, which table 3 shows is not historically relevant to these years. Excluding the 
Workmen’s Compensation interactions, which are economically small, a one-unit 
increase in the fatal accident rate would increase a railwayman’s weekly real wage 
by about 9.26 per cent at the lowest union density in 1903 and about 43.5 per 
cent at the highest union density in 1912.81 The same calculations for the serious 
injury rate give a return of -0.08 per cent and -38.8 per cent in 1903 and 1912, 
respectively. 
To facilitate comparisons between the estimates, the implied value of a statistical 
life (VSL) and serious injury (VSSI) are calculated for each column at the lowest 
and highest level of union density. One way to think about VSL (VSSI) is that  
it is the total amount a railway company would have paid to compensate 100 
railwaymen when their on-the-job fatal (non-fatal) accident rate increased by 1 
per 100 employed. This article does not use VSL or VSSI to make normative 
 
80 Cole and Arnot, Trade unionism, pp. 46–7. By no means unbiased observers, the authors wrote that 
‘improvement [in the scheme for negotiating railwaymen’s wages] since 1911 is due … not to the better scheme   
of conciliation, but to the increased economic power of the Trade Unions’. 
81 The 1903 return is calculated as: 9.26 = [−0.162 + (0.023 × 11.07)] × 100. The 1912 return is calculated 
as: 43.5 = [−0.162 + (0.023 × 25.96)] × 100. 
18 WORKPLACE ACCIDENT RISK 
 
 
= − × × 
judgements about policy choices. Instead, these calculations illustrate the changes 
in compensating differentials for fatal and serious non-fatal accident risk when 
their estimates include additional correlates. The estimations are made in the way 
common to the literature.82 VSL in 1912 is calculated as: 
V SL1912 = [β1 + (β3 × union density1912) + β5] 
×weekl y real wage × 52 × 100 (2) 
 
The weekly rwage is the average weekly real wage taken from table 3 and is used 
in all further calculations in this article to  estimate  the  return to  accident risk. It  
is assumed that railwaymen worked 52 weeks a year. VSL is then divided by 20    to 
convert its value into pounds. While the majority of the independent variables’ 
coefficients in table 4 are statistically significant at conventional levels, the VSL 
and VSSI calculations include all of the respective accident-risk variables and their 
interactions.83 
The first three columns in table 4 show how information about accident risk 
flowed across the railway industry by estimating the response of railwaymen’s 
wages to changes in accident risk irrespective of a man’s company or grade. 
Column 1’s results mirror the visual relationship in figure 2. Column 2 adds the 
Workmen’s Compensation interactions and column 3 includes the union density 
interactions. The highest return to fatal accident risk comes from column 3’s 
estimation, although the results in the first three columns are open to the charge 
that the accident rate coefficients actually capture differences in payments between 
companies or occupations.84 
The inclusion of company dummy variables in column 4 looks at how men within 
the same company recognized accident risk. This does not lead to large changes in 
VSL or VSSI from column 3 unlike when grade dummies are added in column 
5. The 1903 VSL in column 5 is 3.84 times smaller than that in column 4 and 
the 1912 VSL is 2.04 times smaller. The column 5 VSSI is now economically 
insignificant in 1903 and negative in 1912, indicating that railwaymen received 
no compensation for non-fatal accident risk in these years. This means that the 
grade-specific accident rates in the first four columns in part reflected differences 
in payment between grades. The models in columns 5 and 6 are more realistic, 
then, because they control for each man’s company and grade, which accounts 
for promotion limiting a railwayman’s mobility between grades, while virtually 
eliminating it between companies. 
 
82 Kniesner and Viscusi, ‘Value of a statistical life’. Hersch and Viscusi, ‘Immigrant status’, p. 760, refer to this 
equation as the ‘standard equation’ for calculating VSL. It also gives the same values of VSL and VSSI irrespective      
of how the risk variables are scaled, unlike if VSL was calculated as V SL (elnrwage+β1 +β3 +β5 elnrwage ) 52 
100. 
83 The accident risk variables and their interactions are highly correlated, which explains the coefficients’  
larger standard errors in cols. 3–6. The same is true of tab. 5’s results. See Wasserstein, Schirm, and Lazar, 
‘Beyond  “p<0.05”’, and  Greenland, Senn, Rothman, Carlin, Pool, Goodman, and  Altman, ‘Statistical  tests’, for 
a discussion of the movement away from over-reliance on p-values. 
84 Purse, ‘Work-related fatality risks’, pp. 607–8. This section summarizes the findings of others that the accident 
rate coefficients actually capture workers’ industry-specific wage differences, studies acknowledged above in n. 15. 
The men in this article’s dataset all worked within the same industry, but tab. 4 shows that a sizeable occupational 
premium existed. 
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Column 6’s fixed effects model controls for each individual’s time-invariant 
idiosyncrasies, looking at how wages responded to changes in accident risk for 
the individual railwayman over time. The changes in compensation for accident 
risk from column 5 to 6 are small, but in 6 the effect of the institutional changes 
in Workmen’s Compensation are negative for both risk rates compared to the 
preceding period. However, these interactions are economically insignificant. 
What does not change in any of the estimations is the sign on the interactions 
between the accident rates and union density. Although not reported, when these 
estimations exclude the non-fatal risk rate and its interactions, the coefficient on the 
interaction between union density and death rate has a negative sign, demonstrating 
how endogeneity can lead to wildly different conclusions. Alternatively, this article’s 
results show that ASRS representatives were able to transform growing union 
density into power that positively impacted on the fatal accident wage premium 
paid to railwaymen. Column 6’s estimates show that VSL grew from £714 at the 
lowest union density in 1903 to £3,310 at its highest in 1912. This is a range of 
roughly $73,263 to $339,635 in 2,000 US dollars calculated at purchasing power 
parity (PPP) exchange rates.85 Some VSL estimates from non-developed countries 
fall fully or partially within this range, such as Kim and Fishback’s study of turn-of- 
the-century US railwaymen or Liu et al.’s estimates for non-agricultural Taiwanese 
workers in the 1980s.86 
These wage premiums cost the railway companies little. During the week ending 
7 December 1912 the GWR employed 3,734 signalmen at a total wage bill of 
£5,706 in real terms. This comes to £7,946 annually for 100 signalmen, assuming 
the reduction in employees would not affect signalmen’s weekly wages. The lagged 
fatal accident rate for signalmen increased by 0.011 per 100 employed from 1911 
to 1912.87 Compared to a risk-free wage, the GWR would have paid £36.4 more 
annually to bribe these signalmen to remain working, or about 0.46 per cent of their 
total wage bill. The same premium is 0.48 per cent for the GCR and about 0.51 per 
cent for the LSWR.88 These percentages would be even lower if the employment 
returns had not included the lower-paid gatemen with signalmen. 
From an individual railwayman’s perspective, the return to this increase in fatal 
accident risk of 0.011 per 100 employed only reached values resembling economic 
significance in 1911 and 1912. Such a rise in the death rate would have  increased   
a railwayman’s annual wage by 1.57s., or 0.36d. per week, in 1903, figures that are 
not economically significant. In 1912, the railwayman’s annual wage would have 
increased by 7.28s., or about 1.68d. per week, compared to the risk-free rate. This 
means a railwayman would have earned 6.72d. more every four weeks in 1912 
 
85 This article used Bank of England, ‘Inflation calculator’, https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy/ 
inflation/inflation-calculator (accessed on 17 March 2021), to convert VSL estimates from 1904 to 2000 GBP. 
It then used Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Conversion rates: purchasing power 
parities’, https://data.oecd.org/conversion/purchasing-power-parities-ppp.htm (accessed on 17 March 2021), PPP 
exchange rates, to convert to 2000 USD. 
86 American railways: Kim and Fishback, ‘American railroading’, pp. 811–12; Viscusi and Aldy, ‘Value of a 
statistical life’, p. 22. Taiwan: Liu, Hammitt, and Liu, ‘Estimated hedonic wage function’, p. 357; Viscusi  and 
Aldy, ‘Value of a statistical life’, p. 28. 
87 This is close to the largest one-year increase in signalmen’s death rate, which was 0.017 from 1907 to 1908. 
88 Railway Companies (Staff and Wages) (P.P. 1913, LVIII), pp. 566–76. This article did not make the same 
calculations for goods or passenger guards because the employment returns do not list their average wages 
separately. 




when seven pounds of potatoes cost 3.5–4.5d., four pounds of bread cost 5.5–6d., 
and a pound of frozen mutton cost 4.5–5d.89 Using an  accident-risk  premium of 
5d. more every four weeks as the minimum threshold for economic significance, a 
railwayman would have received this much at a union density of 21.2 per cent. 
Union density only exceeded this level in 1911 when railwaymen went on strike 
and in 1912 when the 1911 Agreement took effect. 
Unlike fatal accident risk, the return to non-fatal accident risk is negative at 
every historical level of union density based on column 6’s results. The sign on 
the interaction between union density and serious injury risk is also negative in all 
estimations where it is included. That bearing greater non-fatal accident risk went 
unremunerated may in part stem from measurement error due to the Board’s 1906 
redefinition of what constituted an injury. Because this article somewhat minimized 
this problem by only including the most severe workplace injuries, it more likely 
suggests that a wage premium for serious injury risk was the opportunity cost of a 
higher wage premium for fatal accident risk. 
These outcomes fit with the wider knowledge of the Edwardian railway industry. 
First, it is logical that railway companies would acquiesce to higher compensating 
differentials for fatal accident risk if it meant only a marginal increase in their    
total labour costs. There is also agreement that railwaymen achieved improved 
wages under the 1911 Agreement after failing to do so under the 1907 Scheme,90 
increases that better compensated men for  accepting  on-the-job  fatal  accident 
risk. These wage premiums were also at their highest in 1912 after Lloyd George 
agreed in 1911 that the government would consider allowing railway companies to 
charge higher rates to cover higher labour costs.91 This is not to downplay the role 
played by union representatives and railwaymen who received their highest levels 
of compensation for fatal accident risk after they went on strike in 1911. More 
specific to the ASRS, the Board deemed dangerous the work of all the grades in 
table 1 except signalmen.92 The other five grades accounted for close to 59 per cent 
of ASRS membership in 1911, which makes it quite likely that the ASRS pushed 
for wages to better insure the at-risk grades that comprised a sizeable portion of 
their membership.93 
The change in ASRS leadership may provide another reason why railwaymen’s  
compensating differentials were highest in 1911 and 1912. J. E. Williams succeeded 
Richard Bell as general secretary of the ASRS in 1910 after the ASRS accepted 
Bell’s 1909 resignation with unanimous approval.94 Both had worked for the 
GWR, Bell as a guard, Williams as a signalman. Despite working in the safer 
grade, Williams lost a leg in an 1877 railway accident.95 Bell was also a more 
cautious leader, who said that his personal motto was ‘Slow, Sure, and Determined’, 
and he never ‘agitated for agitation’s sake’.96 This change in leadership does 
 
89 Cost of Living (P.P. 1912–13, LXVI), p. 433. 
90 Bagwell, Railwaymen, p. 305; Clegg, History of British trade unions, vol. 2, p. 39; Gourvish, Railways, pp. 53– 
4. All three authors based this conclusion on changes in railwaymen’s average earnings reported in the Board’s 
annual Wages and Hours of Labour (P.P. 1903–14/16, Annual Returns). 
91 Alderman, ‘Railway companies’, pp. 148–9. 
92 General Report (P.P. 1907, LXXIV), p. 17. 
93 It is assumed that passenger guards again accounted for 4% of ASRS membership in 1911. 
94 Gupta, ‘History’, pp. 435–6. 
95 Ibid., p. 445. 
96 ‘How I got on—Richard Bell’, Pearson’s Weekly, 15 Feb. 1906, p. 577. 
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not conclusively explain why railwaymen received the highest compensating 
differentials for fatal accident risk in 1911 and 1912, but it is not implausible that 
the ASRS sought higher such premiums in the years they were led by a man who 
had suffered a serious injury during his time working as a railwayman. 
The rest of this  section looks at how the relationship between union density    
and accident-risk premiums may have differed based on a man’s company-specific 
human capital as measured by tenure,97 which to my knowledge is the first analysis 
of this kind. The firm-specific human capital model posits that once an employee is 
matched with a firm, both will make investments specific to the other leading to the 
match becoming more lucrative over time.98 In such a scenario, railway companies 
would have preferred acquiescing to higher pay and accident risk premiums for 
longer-tenured men. This in turn may have  dovetailed with a desire by the ASRS  
to reward more senior members, although no evidence of this has been found in  
this study. In contrast, railwaymen with less company-specific capital would have 
been more inclined to quit if the accident-risk premiums they received did not 
compensate them adequately, these competitive pressures then increasing their 
compensating differentials. 
To  test this, the panel is divided into four cohorts based on their 1912 tenure. 
Table 5 lists the cohorts, with the average age of each in 1912 beside it in 
parentheses. Some of the tenures are quite long, due to men joining the company 
as a ‘lad’,99 and the high degree of correlation between tenure and age means these 
results may in part show how union density affected compensating differentials at 
different age levels. The fixed effects regression is used for all groups because it 
controls for the most variables correlated to the accident risk variables, and values 
of VSL and VSSI are presented as in table 4. The results show that higher union 
density lowered the return to serious injury risk for all three cohorts apart from 
the least-tenured. At 1912 union density, this first group would have received an 
economically significant return at a minimum increase in non-fatal injury risk of 
0.034 per 100 employed, which falls within the range of changes in the serious 
injury rate from 1911 to 1912 for these three grades.100 
For fatal accident risk, the results show a non-linear relationship across the four 
cohorts. ‘Wage levelling’ occurs in the least-tenured cohort, which perhaps came at 
the cost of them receiving higher premiums for serious non-fatal accidents. The two 
cohorts with tenures of 20–29 and 30–39 years received the highest wage premiums 
for fatal accident risk from 1911 to 1912, their respective 1912 VSLs larger than 
the VSL for all railwaymen in column 6 of table 4. For the longest-tenured cohort, 
the coefficients on death rate and its interactions are not statistically significant 
at conventional levels, nor is the interaction between Workmen’s Compensation 
and the serious injury rate. This is probably due to the high degree of correlation 
between these variables which are statistically significant in a joint test at the 1 per 
 
 
97 It is not possible to estimate compensating differentials with separate regressions for each grade because there 
is no within-year variation in the accident risk rates at the grade level. 
98 Siebert and Addison, ‘Internal labour markets’, pp. 82–3. 
99 For its youngest employees, railway companies had grade classifications that denoted them as ‘lads’, such as 
Lad Porters or Lad Lampmen. 
100 From 1911 to 1912, the serious injury rate fell for passenger guards and signalmen, but increased by 0.053 
per 100 employed for goods guards. 




Table 5. Regression results for cohorts of railwaymen by company-specific tenure 
Cohorts (average age) 
 
12–19(40.3) 20–9(44.2) 30–9(52.8) 40–7(59.5) 
Death rate 1.129∗ ∗ ∗  (0.305) –0.212∗ ∗  (0.101) –0.356∗ ∗ ∗  (0.116)   –0.204 (0.238) 
Serious injury rate –0.482∗ ∗  (0.233) 0.324∗ ∗ ∗  (0.057) 0.361∗ ∗ ∗  (0.067) 0.418∗ ∗ ∗  (0.130) 
Union density × death rate –0.073∗ ∗ ∗  (0.025) 0.027∗ ∗ ∗  (0.007) 0.038∗ ∗ ∗  (0.009) 0.028 (0.019) 
Union density serious 
injury rate 
Workmen’s Compensation 
1906 × death rate 
0.038∗ ∗  (0.017) –0.028∗ ∗ ∗  (0.005) –0.035∗ ∗ ∗  (0.006) –0.037∗ ∗ ∗  (0.012) 












Notes: VSL: value of a statistical life. VSSI: value of a statistical serious injury. See section IV for an explanation of the calculation 
of VSL and VSSI. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1. Cohorts are for company-specific tenure as of 1912. The average age of each 
cohort in 1912 is reported below it in parentheses. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses beside the coefficients, clustering 
done at the individual railwayman level. The dependent variable is the natural log of weekly wages in shillings deflated by Feinstein’s 
(National income) CPI. Variables included in all regressions but not reported are: quadratics for age and tenure, grade dummies, a 
vector of dummies controlling for the population where the railwayman worked, and a full vector of year dummies. The reference 
category is a signalman working at a station in a place with a population of less than 18,000 in 1902. Due to lack of variation, the 
grade dummies are perfectly collinear with the individual fixed effects in the first and fourth cohorts, as is the passenger guard 
dummy variable in the third cohort. Three of the five population dummies are perfectly collinear with the individual fixed effects  
in the fourth cohort. London_4 is the reference variable for this cohort. 
Source: Railwaymen dataset (see online app. S1). 
 
cent level.101 Calculation of this cohort’s 1912 VSL finds that it is smaller than that 
of the middle two cohorts, suggesting that the relationship between employer and 
employee diminished in value after an extended amount of time with one company. 
Table 5’s results would  probably  apply  to  other  promoted  railwaymen, such as 
firemen and engine drivers, whose work benefited from the accumulation of grade- 
and company-specific human capital.102 Entry-level  grades  like  porters and 
shunters would have had lower tenures, but sold their labour in the context of a 
more competitive market which should have led to higher compensating 
differentials. In terms of company-specific human capital, though, companies 
would have valued these entry-level grades less. 
 
V 
This article has found a number of interesting results pertaining to how union 
density impacts compensating differentials for workplace accident risk and how this 
relationship functioned within the historical context of the Edwardian English and 
Welsh railway industry. In regard to estimation, this article’s regressions controlled 
for variables that previous studies often omitted, such as the non-fatal risk rate 
 
101 The coefficients for death rate and its two interactions are statistically significant in a joint test at the 10% 
level. 
102 TNA, No. 2, RAIL 264/10, p. 90. 
Workmen’ Compensation ∗ ∗ ∗  –0.012 (0.057) 0.104 (0.083) 0.038 (0.160) 
1906 × serious injury rate 
∗ ∗  ∗ ∗ ∗  ∗ ∗ ∗  3.651∗ ∗ ∗  (0.499) 
VSL in 1903 £2,475 £670 £498 £817 
VSL in 1912 –£1,513 £3,817 £3,691 £3,193 
VSSI in 1903 –£473 £108 –£204 £65 
VSSI in 1912 £798 –£3,200 –£3,422 –£3,892 
Observations 649 5,280 3,014 275 
R2-within 0.6528 0.4276 0.1556 0.3917 
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and institutional changes in Workmen’s Compensation. Most importantly, its novel 
application of a balanced panel of railwaymen to this question eliminated another 
source of endogeneity by having fixed effects control for time-invariant individual 
characteristics correlated with the accident-risk variables. The panel was then used 
to study how union density affected compensating differentials, looking at changes 
in this relationship over time at the individual level. 
The results of the regressions show that the ASRS mobilized growing union 
density into power that positively affected railwaymen’s compensating differentials 
for fatal accident risk, but not for non-fatal accident risk, the returns to which 
were negative in the fullest model estimated. A closer look at the return to fatal 
accident risk showed that it was highest in the final two years of this study. This 
corroborates earlier, less rigorous conclusions that railwaymen did not achieve 
improved wages until after the railway strike of August 1911 and the adoption of 
the 1911 Agreement. These are the years in this study during which union density 
was at its highest and when railway companies had received a promise that they 
could increase the rates they charged to cover higher wage costs. 
Finally, the article assessed how the level of company-specific human capital 
may have impacted on the relationship between union density and compensating 
differentials. The results showed a non-linear relationship for both risk-rate 
variables. Higher union density increased the return to non-fatal accidents for the 
least-tenured cohort, but not the others. Conversely, union density had a levelling 
effect on the least-tenured cohort’s return to fatal accident risk. This return was 
positive for the other three cohorts, although the longest-tenured cohort received 
the lowest return of the three by 1912, indicating that the value of company-specific 
tenure diminished over time. It is plausible that these findings would hold for other 
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